The bankruptcy of the investment bank Lehman Brothers was the pivotal event of the 2008 financial crisis and the Great Recession that followed. Ever since the bankruptcy, there has been heated debate about why the Federal Reserve did not rescue Lehman in the same way it rescued other financial institutions, such as Bear Stearns and AIG. The Fed's leaders from that time, especially former Chairman Ben Bernanke, have strongly asserted that they lacked the legal authority to save Lehman because it did not have adequate collateral for the loan it needed to survive. Based on a meticulous four-year study of the Lehman case, The Fed and Lehman Brothers debunks the official narrative of the crisis. It shows that in reality, the Fed could have rescued Lehman but officials chose not to because of political pressures and because they underestimated the damage that the bankruptcy would do to the economy. The compelling story of the Lehman collapse will interest anyone who cares about what caused the financial crisis, whether the leaders of the Federal Reserve have given accurate accounts of their actions, and how the Fed can prevent future financial disasters. 'The bank that precipitated the [financial] crisis was Lehman Brothers. In The Fed and Lehman Brothers, [Laurence M. Ball], a senior American economics professor, has written an entire book on this episode, based on a careful archival reconstruction of events. His findings are fascinating and significant, and so is his villain: not Lehman Brothers but the Federal Reserve.' Paul Collier, The Times Literary Supplement'Laurence Ball's new book The Fed and Lehman Brothers is an excellent book on the 2008 Financial Crisis ... This is a valuable lesson I have learned from Professor Ball's explanation of how the Fed could have saved Lehman. Merely by broadening the types of collateral accepted for cash funding from the Fed and maintaining the functioning of the repo market, the Fed can ensure solvent financial institutions being able to withstand the turbulence of financial crisis.' Seeking Alpha (www.seekingalpha.com)'A monumental piece of scholarship that is essential for understanding the financial crisis of 2008 - and the Great Recession that followed. Meticulous, gripping, and compelling.' David Romer, Herman Royer Professor of Political Economy, University of California, Berkeley'Government failure to rescue Lehman Brothers investment bank, and its bankruptcy in September 2008, precipitated a monumental financial crisis. Laurence M. Ball combs through a mass of documents, and presents a new and quite disturbing perspective on the events. Some may disagree with his take, but it is a milestone in the historical analysis of the crisis.' Andrei Shleifer, Harvard University, Massachusetts'Laurence M. Ball has produced a brilliant and riveting study of the most important moment of modern financial history: the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. In a remarkably detailed and careful analysis Ball argues that decisions were driven by politics rather than sound policy. In short, this is a must-read masterpiece of financial and historical analysis.' Jeffrey Sachs, Columbia University, New York'The official narrative of any crisis is not always the most accurate. Professor Laurence M. Ball's authoritative account of Lehman's demise debunks the Fed's narrative of the calamity and raises uncomfortable questions about the Fed's inconsistent use of its discretionary authority. This captivating book should be required reading for anyone with a stake in preventing the next financial collapse.' Athanasios Orphanides, Massachusetts Institute of Technology'What caused the financial crisis of 2008? Are policymakers ready to handle the next one? These are key questions for anyone interested in economic history and policy. In the past decade, a conventional wisdom has developed about the answers. Yet a new book questions that orthodoxy, offering a
- Libro Impreso
- Edición:
- Editorial: Vintage
- Autor: Ball, Laurence M
